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I. Reform of Regulations on Competition and Prices
France has recently adopted a policy of freed prices. I This new policy
applies to all production, distribution, and service activities, including
those in the public sector, owned by the state or municipalities. The new
rules concern the regulation of prices, competition, consumer protection,
and procedures for applying the new rules.
A. REGULATION OF PRICES
Until recently, prices were set at levels determined by the government.
In the future, prices will be freely set by competition in the marketplace.
The government will be able to regulate prices in two instances, however
the creation of monopolies and long-lasting problems of supply due to a
crisis situation created by exceptional circumstances.
B. COMPETITION
I. In-house Agreements and Dominant Market Position Abuses
As before, in-house agreements and abuses caused by a company's
enjoying a dominant market position are forbidden. Agreements that "aim
to improve the management of small and medium sized businesses" are
exempted, however.
Another new provision involves the abusive use, by a business or group
of businesses, of the economic dependency of a client company or sup-
plier. This practice is forbidden by the new policy. The maximum financial
sanction applicable to a company amounts to five percent of the com-
pany's turnover before the value added tax (V.A.T.). Company directors
will be punishable only if they have fraudulently played a personal and
determining role in the conception, organization, and application of the
illicit practices.
*Prepared by Professor B. Mercadal, Chaire de Droit Commercial, Conservatoire National
des Arts et Mdtiers, Paris.
I. Enactment No 86-1243 of Dec. I, 1986, J.O., Dec. 9, at 14773.
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2. Economic Concentration
Concentrated business activities that result in giving one company de-
termining influence over one or several other companies is subject to
government control. This control is applied when the market-share held
by the companies concerned is over twenty-five percent, or when these
companies totalled a turnover before addition of V.A.T. of seven billion
francs the previous year. The control is also applicable on the initiative
either of the concentrated companies that notify the Minister of Finance
and Budget of their agreement, or by this Minister asking the competition
board for advice. The Minister can accept the concentration operation or
can enjoin the companies to give up their plans and to reestablish the
former situation, or to change their agreement or take the measures nec-
essary to reestablish competition.
3. Discrimination Practices, Refusal to Sell, and Twinned Sales
Without exchanges among companies, discriminatory practices, refusal
to sell, and twinned sales can lead to actions for damages by the victims
of these measures. Refusal to sell is punishable by a prison sentence when
decided in the consumer's favor.
4. Dumping
Selling finished goods at a price below the real cost price remains
forbidden.
C. CONSUMER PROTECTION
Using sales with bonuses, refusing to sell, twinned sales, and forced
and recommended prices remain forbidden.
D. PROCEDURES
Employees of the Ministry of Economy and Finance can carry out in-
vestigations and have free access to all places of business and all documents
of the company in question. Seizures can only be conducted with court
approval. Infractions of the rules of common understanding and abuses of
the dominant position or economic dependence of the other companies will
be submitted to the board of competition, which can decide on financial
sanctions. Either the companies or the ministry can appeal to the board.
II. Abuses of Economic Dependence or Salvage Measures
For the first time, the board of competition has made three decisions
in relation to the prohibition of a company's misuse of a state of depen-
dence of a customer company or supplier.
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The three cases in question 2 set distributors of electrical sound equip-
ment against their suppliers. In the first case, the Chappelle Company
took action against Phillips, claiming that Phillips's policy of price re-
ductions resulted in the imposition of a minimum price on Phillips's re-
tailers. In the other two cases, the same distributor and SEDA company
respectively appealed to the board against Sony for refusing to sell laser
turntables and against JVC Video-France for refusing to sell video cassette
recorders. The board convened according to its emergency procedures
because of the serious and immediate impact on the general economy, on
the sector concerned, and because of the consumer interest, and the
interests of those suing. The board handed down its decision nine days
after commencement of the suit.
The board upheld SEDA's claim of urgency for refusal to sell by JVC
because of the large share of deliveries by this supplier in the annual
turnover of the distributor. On the other hand, the board refused the claim
involving Sony's refusal to sell to Chappelle because this refusal did not
figure largely enough in this company's annual turnover for its financial
situation to be endangered.
Based on these statements, the board ordered that JVC respect standing
orders for SEDA at the same level that deliveries had reached before sales
were refused. If JVC chose not to accept this injunction, the board could
fine it the maximum sum: five percent of the annual turnover of products,
before V.A.T. has been added. The board justified its decision by pointing
out that SEDA was in a state of economic dependence in relation to JVC
because of three factors: (1) SEDA was the sole importer of products
carrying the JVC brand name and the fame of this brand was such that
a distributor had to offer it to consumers; (2) JVC held nine percent of
the VCR market; and (3) the supplier's share of VCR sales by SEDA was
approximately seventy-five percent. The board also found (1) abusive
exploitation of this state of dependency, (2) that competition between
retailers was nonexistent, and (3) that a refusal to deliver to discount
houses was being justified by a desire to keep other distributors from
aligning their prices on the distributors.
III. Corporations
An administrator of a limited holding company can be recalled at any
time by the yearly general assembly. However, the person concerned is
entitled to damages with interest if this right of recall is abused. In one
case, 3 the assembly recalled the chairman of the board of directors from
2. See Lefebvre, 1987/9 BULLETIN RAPIDE DE DROIT DES AFFAIRS 12.
3. Lefebvre, 1987/8 BULLETIN RAPIDE DE DROIT DES AFFAIRS 20.
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his functions as administrator following disagreements between the chair-
man and other administrators over policy matters. This action effectively
ended his role as chairman.
Two days before the assembly met, the chairman had received an ac-
countant's report, concerning the company's financial situation. The Court
de Paris (Paris tribunal) decided that this report put the chairman in a
position to present his defense without the need for further time to prepare
a counter-report. The board also ruled that the summons for him to turn
in the keys to company premises and to his company car immediately
were merely the consequence of his removal.
Frequently, when two companies of comparable size combine they
create a new limited holding company in which both interested parties
become shareholders. The shareholders, however, in order to maintain
equal power in the holding company, give each other in a protocol agree-
ment outside the company's statutes a right to veto and to adopt other
measures comparable to those found in the United States in "closed
corporations." This practice runs into obstacles because the law does not
authorize "closed corporations" and forbids agreements on voting rights.
As a result, the measures in the protocol agreement cannot be drafted
into the holding company's statutes. The court of appeal has recently
held that as soon as a holding company is formed, the company can only
be governed by its statutes and the law. 4 Clauses in the protocol therefore
have no effect. The lesson to be drawn from this decision is abundantly
clear. It is only possible to count on the stipulations in the statutes and
there is no way to set up a balance of votes if the stockholders do not
hold the same number of shares.
IV. Contracts
A. PENAL CLAUSE
Contracts can provide that a debtor who does not fulfill an agreed upon
obligation is to pay the creditor an amount esablished beforehand in the
agreement. This sum can be reduced by the judges if they decide the
amount is grossly excessive.
The Appellate Court of Paris has decided that these measures require
strict interpretation since they deviate from the common law on contrac-
tual obligations. 5 Thus, the grossly excessive character of the clause must
be respected when comparing it with penalties usually called for in agree-
4. Cass. Civ. Comm., Feb. 24, 1987: see Lefebvre, 1987/8 BULLETIN RAPIDE DE DROIT
DES AFFAIRS 20.
5. Id. at 22.
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ments having a similar objective. Accordingly, the court determined that
there was no reason to change the leasing clause of a contract stipulating
that any unpaid rent would be increased by 1.5 percent for each month
of late payment.
B. VOIDING AN ERRONEOUS SALE
An order slip for a water softener stated in capital letters in red ink in
the middle of the page: "guaranteed ten years." The same order slip stated
in small letters, in the left margin on the same page, "electronic hard-
water product" followed by "total guarantee-two years." Only careful
study of the contract informed one that the ten-year guarantee concerned
only the water softener itself and not the electronic hard-water product.
One buyer pointed out the importance to him at the time of purchase
of the guarantee length. Under these conditions, a court declared the
contract void by mistake on one of the main qualities of the product sold. 6
C. LIMITS ON AN EXCLUSIVE-USE CLAUSE
Article 1 of the Law of October 14, 1943, sets a ten-year limit on any
exclusive-use clause that a lessor may impose on a lessee with respect to
material goods. Under this limitation a lessee may not, for the specified
time, use similar or complementary equipment from another supplier.
These measures were judged not applicable in the case of a rental-main-
tenance contract for telephone equipment because the contract set up not
only a single rental but also guaranteed upkeep of the equipment in good
working order. 7
6. Id. at 23.
7. Id.
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